The Risk to Ground Infrastructures from Geomagnetically Induced Currents
The basic principle for the generation of GIC: variations of the ionospheric currents (I(t)) generate an electric field (E(t)) driving GIC. Shown are also real GIC recordings from the Finnish natural gas pipeline.
A time-varying magnetic field external to the Earth induces electric currents in the conducting ground. These currents create a secondary (internal) magnetic field. As a consequence of Faraday's law of induction, an electric field at the surface of the Earth is induced associated with time variations of the magnetic field. The surface electric field causes electrical currents, known as geomagnetically induced currents (GIC), to flow in any conducting structure, for example, a power or pipeline grid grounded in the Earth. This electric field, measured in V/km, acts as a voltage source across networks.
Examples of conducting networks are electrical power transmission grids, oil and gas pipelines, undersea communication cables, telephone and telegraph networks and railways. GIC are often described as being quasi direct current (DC), although the variation frequency of GIC is governed by the time variation of the electric field. For GIC to be a hazard to technology, the current has to be of a magnitude and occurrence frequency that makes the equipment susceptible to either immediate or cumulative damage. The size of the GIC in any network is governed by the electrical properties and the topology of the network. The largest magnetospheric-ionospheric current variations, resulting in the largest external magnetic field variations, occur during geomagnetic storms and it is then that the largest GIC occur. Significant variation periods are typically from seconds to about an hour, so the induction process involves the upper mantle and lithosphere. Since the largest magnetic field variations are observed at higher magnetic latitudes, GIC have been regularly measured in Canadian, Finnish and Scandinavian power grids and pipelines since the 1970s. GIC of tens to hundreds of Amperes have been recorded. GIC have also been recorded at mid-latitudes during major storms. There may even be a risk to low latitude areas, especially during a storm commencing suddenly because of the high, short-period rate of change of the field that occurs on the dayside of the Earth.
GIC have been known since the mid-1800s when it was noted that electrical telegraph systems could sometimes run without power during geomagnetic storms, described at the time as operating on the “celestial battery”, while at other times they were completely inoperative . See also: Aurora (astronomy)
GIC in power grids
Modern electric power transmission systems consist of generating plants inter-connected by electrical circuits that operate at fixed transmission voltages controlled at substations. The grid voltages employed are largely dependent on the path length between these substations and 200kV-700kV system voltages are common. There is a trend towards higher voltages and lower line resistances to reduce transmission losses over longer and longer path lengths. Low line resistances produce a situation favourable to the flow of GIC. Power transformers have a magnetic circuit that is disrupted by the quasi-DC GIC: the field produced by the GIC offsets the operating point of the magnetic circuit and the transformer may go into half-cycle saturation. This produces a harmonic-rich AC waveform, localised heating and leads to high reactive power demands, inefficient power transmission and possible mis-operation of protective measures. Balancing the network in such situations requires significant additional reactive power capacity . The magnitude of GIC that will cause significant problems to transformers varies with transformer type. Modern industry practice is to specify GIC tolerance levels on new transformers.
On 13 March 1989 a severe geomagnetic storm caused the collapse of the Hydro-Québec power grid in a matter of seconds as equipment protection relays tripped in a cascading sequence of events . Six million people were left without power for nine hours, with significant economic loss. Since 1989 power companies in North America, the UK, Northern Europe and elsewhere have invested in evaluating the GIC risk and in developing mitigation strategies.
GIC risk can, to some extent, be reduced by capacitor blocking systems, maintenance schedule changes, additional on-demand generating capacity, and ultimately, load shedding. These options are expensive and sometimes impractical. The continued growth of high voltage power networks results in higher risk. This is partly due to the increase in the interconnectedness at higher voltages; connections in terms of power transmission to grids in the auroral zone, and grids operating closer to capacity than in the past.
To understand the flow of GIC in power grids and to advise on GIC risk, analysis of the quasi-DC properties of the grid is necessary . This must be coupled with a geophysical model of the Earth that provides the driving surface electric field, determined by combining time-varying ionospheric source fields and a conductivity model of the Earth. Such analyses have been performed for North America, the UK and in Northern Europe. The complexity of power grids, the source ionospheric current systems and the 3D ground conductivity make an accurate analysis difficult . By being able to analyse major storms and their consequences we can build a picture of the weak spots in a transmission system and run hypothetical event scenarios.
Grid management is also aided by space weather forecasts of major geomagnetic storms. This allows for mitigation strategies to be implemented. Solar observations provide a 1-3 day warning of an Earth-bound coronal mass ejection (CME), depending on CME speed. Following this, detection of the solar wind shock that precedes the CME in the solar wind, by spacecraft at the Lagrangian L1 point, gives a definite 20-60 minutes warning of a geomagnetic storm (again depending on local solar wind speed). The magnitude and arrival time of a CME after detection is unknown, although there is much research and model development within the space weather community.
The basic principle for the generation of GIC: variations of the ionospheric currents (I(t)) generate an electric field (E(t)) driving GIC. Shown are also real GIC recordings from the Finnish natural gas pipeline.
A time-varying magnetic field external to the Earth induces electric currents in the conducting ground. These currents create a secondary (internal) magnetic field. As a consequence of Faraday's law of induction, an electric field at the surface of the Earth is induced associated with time variations of the magnetic field. The surface electric field causes electrical currents, known as geomagnetically induced currents (GIC), to flow in any conducting structure, for example, a power or pipeline grid grounded in the Earth. This electric field, measured in V/km, acts as a voltage source across networks.
Examples of conducting networks are electrical power transmission grids, oil and gas pipelines, undersea communication cables, telephone and telegraph networks and railways. GIC are often described as being quasi direct current (DC), although the variation frequency of GIC is governed by the time variation of the electric field. For GIC to be a hazard to technology, the current has to be of a magnitude and occurrence frequency that makes the equipment susceptible to either immediate or cumulative damage. The size of the GIC in any network is governed by the electrical properties and the topology of the network. The largest magnetospheric-ionospheric current variations, resulting in the largest external magnetic field variations, occur during geomagnetic storms and it is then that the largest GIC occur. Significant variation periods are typically from seconds to about an hour, so the induction process involves the upper mantle and lithosphere. Since the largest magnetic field variations are observed at higher magnetic latitudes, GIC have been regularly measured in Canadian, Finnish and Scandinavian power grids and pipelines since the 1970s. GIC of tens to hundreds of Amperes have been recorded. GIC have also been recorded at mid-latitudes during major storms. There may even be a risk to low latitude areas, especially during a storm commencing suddenly because of the high, short-period rate of change of the field that occurs on the dayside of the Earth.
GIC have been known since the mid-1800s when it was noted that electrical telegraph systems could sometimes run without power during geomagnetic storms, described at the time as operating on the “celestial battery”, while at other times they were completely inoperative . See also: Aurora (astronomy)
GIC in power grids
Modern electric power transmission systems consist of generating plants inter-connected by electrical circuits that operate at fixed transmission voltages controlled at substations. The grid voltages employed are largely dependent on the path length between these substations and 200kV-700kV system voltages are common. There is a trend towards higher voltages and lower line resistances to reduce transmission losses over longer and longer path lengths. Low line resistances produce a situation favourable to the flow of GIC. Power transformers have a magnetic circuit that is disrupted by the quasi-DC GIC: the field produced by the GIC offsets the operating point of the magnetic circuit and the transformer may go into half-cycle saturation. This produces a harmonic-rich AC waveform, localised heating and leads to high reactive power demands, inefficient power transmission and possible mis-operation of protective measures. Balancing the network in such situations requires significant additional reactive power capacity . The magnitude of GIC that will cause significant problems to transformers varies with transformer type. Modern industry practice is to specify GIC tolerance levels on new transformers.
On 13 March 1989 a severe geomagnetic storm caused the collapse of the Hydro-Québec power grid in a matter of seconds as equipment protection relays tripped in a cascading sequence of events . Six million people were left without power for nine hours, with significant economic loss. Since 1989 power companies in North America, the UK, Northern Europe and elsewhere have invested in evaluating the GIC risk and in developing mitigation strategies.
GIC risk can, to some extent, be reduced by capacitor blocking systems, maintenance schedule changes, additional on-demand generating capacity, and ultimately, load shedding. These options are expensive and sometimes impractical. The continued growth of high voltage power networks results in higher risk. This is partly due to the increase in the interconnectedness at higher voltages; connections in terms of power transmission to grids in the auroral zone, and grids operating closer to capacity than in the past.
To understand the flow of GIC in power grids and to advise on GIC risk, analysis of the quasi-DC properties of the grid is necessary . This must be coupled with a geophysical model of the Earth that provides the driving surface electric field, determined by combining time-varying ionospheric source fields and a conductivity model of the Earth. Such analyses have been performed for North America, the UK and in Northern Europe. The complexity of power grids, the source ionospheric current systems and the 3D ground conductivity make an accurate analysis difficult . By being able to analyse major storms and their consequences we can build a picture of the weak spots in a transmission system and run hypothetical event scenarios.
Grid management is also aided by space weather forecasts of major geomagnetic storms. This allows for mitigation strategies to be implemented. Solar observations provide a 1-3 day warning of an Earth-bound coronal mass ejection (CME), depending on CME speed. Following this, detection of the solar wind shock that precedes the CME in the solar wind, by spacecraft at the Lagrangian L1 point, gives a definite 20-60 minutes warning of a geomagnetic storm (again depending on local solar wind speed). The magnitude and arrival time of a CME after detection is unknown, although there is much research and model development within the space weather community.
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